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Abstract 
 
We investigate endurance, the capacity to maintain levels of performance through internal 
rather than external motivation in non-rewarding tasks and over sequences of tasks, though a 
lab experiment. The significant driver of performance is payment scheme order for women 
and payment schemes for men. Both women and men respond to social cues, through 
increased intrinsic motivation (ambition) for women and through extrinsic motivation 
(competition) for men. We suggest implications for reward schemes in the workplace and for 
selection into executive positions. 
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Introduction 
 
In a bid to understand how to achieve equality in the workplace (Bohnet, 2016), a wealth of 
studies are seeking to ascertain the extent to which observed gaps are a result of a patriarchal 
division of labour that assigns women to less rewarded tasks and the way in which this 
combines with gender differences in stated or revealed preferences (which of course are 
formed within the same system). A large body of experimental and survey literature 
documents gender differences in preferences for competitiveness, risk, and altruism (Eckel 
and Grossman, 1998 and 2008; Gneezy et al, 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007 and 2011; 
Croson and Gneezy, 2008; Apicella et al., 2015), and has been variously linked to gender 
gaps in education (Buser et al. 2014; Niederle, 2010), occupational choices (Bertrand et al., 
2010; Goldin, 2014; Bandiera et al. 2016), and gender gaps in pay and career (Babcock et al. 
2017a and b; Reuben et al. 2015).  
 
Women are actually found to be no less responsive to performance pay than men (Bandiera et 
al., 2017), no gender differences in performance are found when competing against oneself 
(Apicella et al., 2017) and when considering size effects there are practically no gender 
differences in the distribution of risk preferences (for a meta review see Nelson, 2015). A 
consistent body literature has instead shown that the proportion of women who choose a 
competitive task is smaller, certeris paribus, across several studies (for a review see Niederle, 
2016 and 2017) based on the choice of piece rate rather than tournament payment schemes in 
experiments conducted in both lab and field. The latter has been used to formulate policy 
suggestions to teach women to compete more on the one hand, and to focus less on 
competitive schemes for motivation and remuneration purposes in the workplace on the 
other. Recent findings from the Global Preference Survey (Falk et al., 2015) also suggest that 
women tend to exhibit a stronger social predisposition than men, and that they are more 
responsive to social cues (Eckel and Fullbrunn, 2015; Zetland and Della Giusta, 2013), which 
features as part of the explanation for another recently studied phenomenon: the effect on 
women of being offered and accepting tasks associated with low promotability (Babcock et 
al., 2017 a and b), that is tasks that have to seemingly be endured without real career benefits. 
In this case, the perception that women are more altruistic functions as a reason for receiving 
the offers, and the fear of the backlash ensuing when not doing so motivates the acceptances 
(Babcock et al., 2017b). The research agenda, Niederle (2017) argues, requires establishing 
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links between competitiveness and other behavioural traits, and this is indeed the first 
objective of our paper.  
 
We contribute to this body of literature by focussing on the ability to maintain performance in 
non-rewarding tasks, focusing on a characteristic that has not to our knowledge been 
explicitly incorporated in the experimental literature on gender differences. We call this 
endurance, or the capacity to maintain levels of performance through internal rather than 
external motivation, and speculate that this feature is strongly associated with culturally and 
party self-enforced expectations of female behaviour (Coffman, 2014; Bordalo et al., 2016) 
The literature on gender norms suggests that women on average are expected to be 
conscientious and compliant (Carter, 2014; Eswaran, 2014) and the evidence on the 
distribution of personality traits suggest that on responses to the Big Five Inventory, women 
report on average higher levels of neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness than men across most nations (Schmit et al., 2008; Costa et al., 2001). Men 
on average perceive their general intellect as higher and they tend to overestimate it, whilst 
women on average tend to do the opposite (Karwowski et al., 2013)1. Women also tend to 
state more than men that social objectives are more important than the goals connected with 
achievements (Kuhn and Villeval, 2015; Piirto, 1991). All this may fuel stereotyping by 
principals and by agents themselves (as found in Babcock et al., 2017) and lead to such tasks 
being disproportionately allocated to women, under the distorted belief that they will be 
better at them, whether in the workplace or the household, thereby also creating self-fulfilling 
dynamics of discrimination. The process has been discussed in models of belief formation by 
Gennaioli and Schleifer (2010) who show that significant biases in beliefs can arise from the 
use of representativeness heuristics (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1983) which lead to 
exaggerating small differences in some parts of the distribution of attributes of one group 
relative to another. In particular, Oxoby (2014) shows how the process of forming beliefs 
about one’s own ability incorporating irrelevant information on observable types can bias 
downward one’s perception of one’s own ability (or upward if the type-based biases are 
positive), and lead to inefficient allocations of agents across more and less skilled sectors in 
the labour market and a growing segregation over time through the feedback to agents from 
increased type-based biases in their beliefs. A first objective of the paper is to see whether 
there are indications that significant differences in average endurance may be spontaneously 
                                                 
1 Parents also perceive their sons’ intelligence to be higher than their daughters’, while children perceive the 
intelligence of their fathers to be higher than that of their mothers (Karwowski et al., 2013).  
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arising in the context of an experiment simulating a situation in which random sequences of 
tasks associated with different rewards are presented to agents who have to choose the level 
of effort to dedicate to the task, given the reward mechanism. Our second objective is to show 
how the particular order of sequences of both rewarding (competitive and not competitive) 
and non-rewarding tasks affects endurance, to see whether being assigned to non-rewarding 
tasks hurts subsequent performance in rewarding ones, and whether there are any differences 
in average responses by women and men to sequences of tasks, as well as the social effects 
from performing the task in mixed or single sex environments. The third objective is to 
discuss the significance of these gender differences for policy on the basis of size effects and 
not just differences in averages, in order to distinguish between those that can fuel biased 
beliefs (and inefficient allocations) and those that can guide positive selection. We design an 
experiment to measure endurance in two ways: through evidence of sustained performance in 
a repetitive task in the absence of external rewards, and in continued performance across 
sequences of tasks. We also use information from a post experimental survey to corroborate 
our results.  
 
 
2. Experimental procedure 
 
To test endurance, we designed a programme we called Climb the Ladder, in which 
participants are presented with a randomised sequence of choices of payment schemes for the 
same repetitive task, consisting of dragging as many balls as possible across the computer 
screen from one container to another with the mouse, in 90 seconds (see screenshot below). 
Participants do not have a choice of reward scheme, this is simply assigned to them 
randomly.   
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The reward schemes are as follows: a fixed rate of £3, a rate of £0.05 for each ball 
successfully moved from one container to the other, or a tournament against the other 
participants in the group in which only the winner is paid a sum of £0.10 for each ball 
successfully moved. 237 participants took part in our experiment at the University of 
Birmingham lab in May and June 2016. We also conducted a post experimental survey 
asking attitudinal questions on political views, altruism, risk, trust and the importance of 
money (see appendices for instructions and survey), which we use in our discussion of the 
experimental data.  
 
2. Results 
 
Below we present a comparative analysis of tasks performance across treatments (payment 
schemes), before studying the differentiated impact of the environment (mixed vs. unmixed 
groups) and the sequence of the games on performance.  
 
1. Gender difference in performance under different payment schemes. 
 
Figure 1 shows contrasting effects of payment schemes on gender. Consider first the payment 
scheme’s impact on women’s performance. Women’s average score decreases by only 0.84 
points (-1.8%) in the fixed rate scheme compared to the piece rate scheme. A Mann-Whitney 
pairwise test indicates that the difference is not significant (p-value2=0.4009), meaning that 
women, on average, keep on performing even with no financial incentives at stake.  Women 
slightly increase their performance in the tournament scheme by 0.91 points (+1.96%) 
compared to the piece rate scheme, but again the difference is not significant (p-
value=0.4688). Overall, women do not seem to react strongly in terms of effort to the 
different payment schemes. Oppositely, men’s performance across the three treatments 
indicates a significant response to the payment schemes, though the size effects are quite 
small. Men increase their performance by 2 points (+4.05%) in the tournament compared to 
the piece rate scheme (p-value =0.0822, Cohen’s d3=-0.19). In the fix rate scheme, men 
                                                 
2
 We use the two-sided Mann-Whitney U test to compare the performance of women and men across treatments 
and investigate gender differences within treatments, in all test reported in this paper unless specified otherwise. 
3 We report Cohen’s d values to measure the effect size. The measure of ‘substantive significance’ of the 
observed difference complements the ‘statistical difference’ by addressing the issues of within-group variation 
 6 
decrease their performance by 1.96 points (-3.94%) compared to the piece rate scheme (p-
value =0.1384.) and by 3.96 points (-7.7%) compared to the tournament scheme (p-value 
=0.0023, Cohen’s d =-0.38). 
 
The econometric analysis reported in Table 2 provides more formal support to these results. 
Table 2 is made of 3 panels. The first panel displays the results of a hierarchical Tobit 
regression4 in which the dependant variable is individual performance measured through the 
consecutive scores obtained in the 3 games played in the experiment. The second and third 
panel displays similar regressions but respectively restricted to the men and women samples. 
Model 1 shows the contrasting effect of the two distinctive payment schemes on individual 
performance. Players’ performance is predicted to increase by 1.310 units under the 
tournament scheme treatment compared with the piece rate scheme treatment. This 
coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. Oppositely, players’ performance is predicted to 
decrease by 1.350 units (the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level) under the fix rate 
scheme treatment. To check for robustness, model 2 includes additional socio-demographics 
and behavioural variables. Both coefficients remain significant at the 0.05 level in Model 2. 
Model 3 and 4 proceed to the same hierarchical regression but for the men sample only. 
Results found in model 1 and 2 are repeated. Also, coefficients are slightly higher. Men’s 
performance is predicted to increase by 1.995 units under the tournament scheme treatment 
(significant at the 0.05 level) while their performance is predicted to decrease by 1.945 units 
(significant at the 0.05 level) under the fix rate scheme treatment. The same regressions run 
on the women sample only (Model 5 and 6) show no significant impact of payment scheme 
treatments on their performance. Altogether, the econometric analysis confirms earlier 
findings, which are summarized in the following result: 
 
RESULT 1. (a) The tournament scheme has a positive impact on men’s performance, 
but no impact on women’s performance. (b) The fix rate scheme has a negative impact 
on men’s performance, but no impact on women’s performance. Altogether, this means 
that women are on average more likely than men to internalize the effect of their effort. 
                                                                                                                                                        
and across-group overlap. See Nelson (2015) for a full discussion of the methodological issues surrounding the 
assessment of sample difference in economics and most particularly its impact on the gender literature.
 
4
 We selected a Tobit model, also called ‘censored regression model’, which is particularly appropriate to 
estimate linear relationship between variables when there is censoring from below and above in the dependant 
variable. The performance scored under the three treatments represents our dependant variable in this case, for 
which we cannot observe any scores below 0 nor above 80. 
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Figure 1 : Mean of games’ scores by gender (with 95% confidence intervals for the means) 
 
 
 
2. Group composition (Mixed vs. Unmixed) and performance 
 
Figure 2 illustrates individual performance across the 3 payment schemes by gender and 
group composition. The most noticeable outcome emerging from this figure is the 
cancellation of the gender effect on performance in the mixed environment. Women’s 
performance is boosted in the mixed treatment, under the three payments schemes. For 
instance, in the piece rate scheme, women’s score increases by 3.26 points in the mixed 
treatment compared to the unmixed treatment, while score increases by 1.57 points in the fix 
rate scheme and 2.86 points in the tournament. Figure 3 and Figure 4 present scores’ 
distribution by gender for the tournament in the single sex and mixed treatments, 
respectively. To compare the performance of women and men across treatments, we use the 
two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, which compares distribution, as further presented in Figure 
5. In the mixed treatment, we find no significant gender difference in performance with the 
fix rate, the piece rate and the tournament schemes, the p-value of the two-sided Mann 
Whitney U test is 0.744, 0.876 and 0.604 respectively. On the contrary, there is a significant 
gender difference in performance in the single sex treatments, particularly in the fix rate (p-
value=0.001, Cohen’s d=0.48, so a medium size effect) and the tournament (p-value=0.0006, 
Cohen’s d=0.58, a medium size effect), and a little smaller in the piece rate (p-value=0.036, 
Cohen’s d=0.30 a small size effect). This is illustrated in Figure 5. The fact that we observe 
no gender effect in the mixed treatment under the tournament scheme comes from both an 
increase of performance among women and a decrease of performance among men. A first 
explanation could be that it results from different expectations in terms of performance, with 
women anticipating lower performance average when competing with other women, while 
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the opposite happens for men. This would translate into different expected utility of effort 
under the different scenarios. Another important point is that it stands in sharp contrast with 
existing work. For instance, results from Gneezy et al. (2003) show that men performance 
increase in mixed environment, while the opposite happens for women. There might be 
various explanations for such findings. First, the cultural origin of the sample (Israel versus 
UK) may contribute to explain this different behavioural pattern. A study from Wiseman5 
(2008) reports a high proportion of single-sex education in Israel, higher than the 
international average, while England stands on the international average. A second point to 
be highlighted is the fact that this levelling feature of the mixed environment observed in our 
experiment is visible in both non-competitive treatments (namely fix rate and piece rate 
schemes). In this regard, the contrasting effects of mixed environment on men and women 
performance may only be partially explained by consequential monetary rewards. Although 
we can not rule out the impact of mixed environment on extrinsic motivation, this may 
however suggest the potential influence on intrinsic motivation as well. Those findings 
deserve further research and discussions remains speculative, but they suggest that the 
spillovers associated to group composition may go beyond what is usually assumed. Model 1 
to 4 provides additional support for those findings. For instance, model 2 shows that Men’s 
performance increase by 3.2 units in a single sex environment (significant at the 0.10 level). 
In parallel, model 2 reports a negative coefficient for women’s performance in single sex 
environment, although the coefficient is not significant. 
Figure 2: Mean of games scores by gender and group composition 
 
 
                                                 
5 Wiseman, A. (2008). A Culture of (In)Equality?: A Cross-national Study of Gender Parity and Gender 
Segregation in National School Systems. Research in Comparative and International Education, 3(2), 179-201. 
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RESULT 2. (a) Women perform better in the mixed treatment, but men perform better 
in the single sex treatment. (b) The contrasting impact of group composition on men 
and women performance holds in the absence of external incentives.  
 
Figure 3: Score Distribution in the tournament scheme among Mixed versus Unmixed 
groups (Men sample) 
 
 
Figure 4 : Score Distribution in the tournament scheme among Mixed versus Unmixed 
groups (Women sample) 
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Figure 5: Mean of scores by gender and group composition with statistical significance 
(Mann-Whitney test) 
 
 
 
 
3.   The impact of payment scheme order on performance 
 
Interesting findings arise when looking at payment scheme order effect (table 1). To start 
with, women score better when the game played at the start is not based on 
performance. Best scores for round 1 are obtained under the fix rate scheme. Their score is 
46.93 in the fix rate scheme, compared to 43.48 in the piece rate scheme, though the size 
effect is quite small (p-value= 0.1269, Cohen’s d=0.30). We observe the opposite for men. 
More specifically, men start better with the tournament scheme, scoring 53.53, which is 
significantly higher than with the piece rate (+4.27; p-value=0.0757, Cohen’s d=0.39) and 
especially the fix rate which also has a large size effect (+8.73, p-value=0.0010, Cohen’s 
d=0.83). Moreover, this score obtained when tournament is played first outperforms all other 
scores across treatments and games’ orders. But at the same time, men fail to keep the 
cadence and their performance decrease as the tournament treatment is played second or 
third. The opposite is observed for women, who increase their performance as they play, both 
for the tournament scheme and the piece rate scheme. For instance, women’s performance 
increase by 10.81% in the tournament treatment if the game is played at the end of the 
sequence compared to the same game played at the start (p-value=0.0316, Cohen’s d=0.52). 
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Oppositely, men performance in the tournament treatment decrease by 6.16% when the game 
is plaid third compared to when the game is played at the start of the sequence (p-
value=0.0337, Cohen’s d=0.34). Overall, if men significantly outperform women in the 
tournament scheme when the game is played first and with a strong size effect (53.53 vs. 
44.55, p-value=0.0018, Cohen’s d=0.84), the difference vanishes when the same game is 
played at the end of the sequence with women slightly outperforming men, although the 
difference is not significant (49.16 vs. 49.43, p-value=0.8655).  
 
Model 1 and 2 highlight a payment scheme order effect, driven by the women sample as 
shown in model 5 and 6. This suggests the existence of a learning effect shaping women 
performance. The opposite effect observed for men is however absent from models 1 to 4, 
where the effect of payments schemes (or the response to incentive) prevails, suggesting that 
the response to incentive compensates a potential fatigue effect.  
 
RESULT 3. (a) Women’s performances increase over sequences with small size effects 
b) Oppositely, men’s performances decrease over sequences with strong size effects (c) 
Overall, the significant driver of performance is payment scheme order for women (who 
do better if the first game is not based on performance), and payment schemes for men, 
both with strong size effects. 
 
Table 1 – Game performance and ordering effects (standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
Game 
order 
          All         Piece rate           Fix rate        Tournament 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female  Male 
Femal
e 
1st  
49.01 
(1.06) 
45.02 
(1.01) 
 
49.26 
(1.62) 
43.48 
(1.76) 
 
44.8 
(1.76) 
46.93 
(1.60) 
 
53.53 
(1.97) 
44.83 
(1.84) 
2nd 
49.52 
(1.14) 
46.593 
(0.97) 
 
47.71 
(3.03) 
48.97 
(1.44) 
 
49.2 
(1.59) 
44.76 
(1.68) 
 
51.11 
(1.92) 
46.53 
(1.71) 
3rd  
49.71 
(0.82) 
47.46 
(0.80) 
 
50.34 
(1.25) 
47.73 
(1.41) 
 
47.24 
(1.91) 
44.69 
(1.36) 
 
50.24 
(1.29) 
49.68 
(1.32) 
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The Tobit models presented in Table 2 highlight a number of additional results. First, men 
below 22 (68.47%) tend to perform better than their older counterparts. No such effect is 
found among women. Second, free riders, or people finding justified to avoid paying fares on 
public transportation, tend to perform worse than people reporting greater honesty in this 
context. The effect disappears with the men sample and is significant at the 10% level with 
the women sample. Women are also significantly more likely to find it justified to avoid 
paying fares on public transportation (30.89% compared to 21.62% for men, p 
value=0.0119). This finding is in line with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) that when 
altruism is expensive women are on average kinder, but when it is cheap men are on average 
more altruistic. 
 
Finally, in the post experimental survey, participants were asked to rate the importance of 
maximising their own income in the games from 1 (‘Not important at all’) to 4 (‘extremely 
important’). Not so surprisingly, the importance of maximising money is a significant 
explanatory variable of performance in the second model, where additional control variable 
were included. Looking at distribution among the 4 categories between participants, we 
observe that they were 12.39% to select the option ‘Not so important’ (10.81% for men; 
13.82% for women), 53.41% to select the option ‘Very important’ (47.74% for men, 58.54% 
for women) and 34.18% to select the option ‘Extremely important’ (41.44% for men, 27.64% 
for women). No participants went for the category ‘Not important at all’. Looking more 
specifically across gender, model 4 and 6 show that the effect remains significant at the 5% 
level for men (model 4), but disappears for women (model 6). Indeed, the performance 
increases significantly for men associated to category 2 to 4 (44.42/ 49.73/ 50.36) while 
performance remains relatively stable among women (46.24/ 46.49/ 46.15). Women and men 
are both motivated by monetary rewards, but the effect on performance is relatively more 
important and on average significantly so for men than for women. 
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  Table 2  Determinants of performance - Hierarchical censored Tobit model (0-80) 
 All sample  Men sample  Women sample 
  Dependent variable Score  Score  Score 
Models: 
XT Tobit 
(1) 
XT Tobit 
(2) 
 
XT Tobit 
(3) 
XT Tobit 
(4) 
 
XT Tobit 
(5) 
XT Tobit    
(6) 
Tournament scheme 
1.310** 
(0.55) 
1.310** 
(0.55) 
 1.995** 
(0.86) 
1.995** 
(0.86) 
 0.682 
(0.70) 
0.682   
(0.70)   
Fix rate scheme 
-1.350** 
(0.55) 
-1.350** 
(0.55) 
 -1.945** 
(0.86) 
-1.945** 
(0.86) 
 -0.894 
(0.70) 
-0.894   
(0.70)   
Men only 
2.449* 
(1.43) 
3.206* 
(1.84) 
 2.559* 
(1.87) 
3.498* 
(1.79) 
 
- - 
Women only 
-2.388 
(1.46) 
-2.426 
(1.65) 
 
- - 
 -2.459 
(1.67) 
-2.540    
(1.72)    
Payment scheme order 
(1=First; 2=Second; 
3=Third) 
0.673** 
(0.27) 
0.673** 
(0.27) 
 
0.084 
(0.435) 
0.084 
(0.43) 
 
1.170*** 
(0.35) 
1.170***    
(0.35)      
Socio-demographics         
Sex (0=Men; 1=Women) 
 
1.273 
(2.01) 
 
 - 
 
 - 
Age category (0=’<22’) 
 
-2.684** 
(1.24) 
 
 
-3.158* 
(1.80) 
 
 
-2.019   
(1.68)   
Work experience 
 
-2.630 
(1.94) 
 
 
-0.052 
(2.71) 
 
 
-5.268*   
(2.90)     
Political attitude 
 
-0.120 
(0.39) 
 
 
-0.094 
(0.52) 
 
 
-0.336      
(0.60)      
Behavioural         
Dishonesty6 
 
-2.907** 
(1.34) 
 
 
-3.245 
(1.99) 
 
 
-3.276*    
(1.82)     
Trust7 
 
1.062 
(1.28) 
 
 
2.752 
(1.84) 
 
 
-0.667    
(1.76)     
Fairness8 
 
-1.732 
(1.26) 
 
 
-1.499 
(1.79) 
 
 
-2.082     
(1.77)     
Risk preference9 
 
0.312 
(0.31) 
 
 
0.519 
(0.44) 
 
 
-0.049     
(0.45)     
Income maximisation10 
 
1.832** 
(0.92) 
 
 
2.864** 
(1.28) 
 
 
1.039     
(1.35)     
         
Constant 
46.39*** 
(1.17) 
42.514*** 
(4.74) 
 47.429*** 
(1.86) 
35.415*** 
(6.16) 
 45.527*** 
(1.50) 
51.954***   
(6.60) 
Left-censored 
observations 
0 0  0 0  0 0 
Right-censored 
observations 
0 0  0 0  0 0 
Observations 702 702  333 333  369 369 
Groups 234 234  111 111  123 123 
Log-Likelihood -2481.266 -2472.897  -1191.121 -1183.731  -1283.632 -1279.501 
                                                 
6
Do you think that it is justified to avoid the fare on public transport? (NO=0; YES=1) 
7
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people? (NO=0; YES=1)  
8 
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be 
fair? (NO=0; YES=1) 
9
 Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please use 
the following scale, where the value 0 means: "risk averse" and the value 10 means: "fully prepared to take 
risks".  
10
How important was it for you to maximise your own income? (1:Not important at all; 2:Not so important; 
3:Very important; 4:Extremely important) 
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3. Conclusions 
 
Our experiment identifies gender differences in endurance, the capacity to maintain 
performance in non-rewarding tasks and over sequences of tasks. In particular, whilst both 
women and men are motivated by monetary rewards (as confirmed by the post experimental 
survey), the relative response of men to monetary (or extrinsic) rewards is on average higher 
(result 1). The size effects are not large, which suggests that these differences are indeed 
likely to lead to the formation of biased beliefs and the disproportionate allocation of non-
rewarding tasks to women, as found in Babcock et al. (2017a and b). 
 
We also find that women respond to social cues (result 2 on performance and gender 
composition of groups) but the effect is more through increased intrinsic motivation 
(ambition) than extrinsic motivation and opposite for men: men don’t bother or dare to 
compete as much when women are present and women instead get more ambitious when men 
are present. This can also help explain the relatively small advantages of gender segregation 
in education (college majors explain a substantial part of gender segregation across 
occupational groups in the US- Schneeweis and Zweimuller, 2012) on later labour market 
outcomes (Sullivan et al., 2011, find only a 5% wage premium for working women in the 
UK). 
 
When looking at sequences of tasks (result 3) we instead find strong size effects in women’s 
response to payment scheme order (and particularly a dislike of tournament as found in 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, and related literature), men’s sensitivity to extrinsic rewards 
and men’s decreasing performances over sequences of tasks. The first result lends support to 
suggestions to consider the inadvertently discriminatory effect of competitive tasks being 
presented first in recruitment processes based on multiple rounds (and often dominating 
amongst those based on one shot performance assessments). The latter two indicate a scope 
for positive selection of women in positions of responsibility where it has been argued that 
intrinsic motivation should be emphasised more to help redress both the adverse 
consequences of bonuses on executives’ performance and the ballooning compensation gaps 
and executive pay rat races (Frey and Gallus, 2017).  
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Appendices 
 
1. Participant Instructions 
In this experiment you will be performing the same task three different times. The task will 
consist of moving as many balls as possible from one container to another, using the mouse, 
in 90 seconds. In order to get familiar with the task there is first a training session. 
This is an example of how the task looks like: 
 
 
In order to move the balls you need to click on the ball in the left-hand side container and 
drag the ball to the right-hand side container. The number of balls successfully moved in the 
right-hand side container appears on the top of the screen. To help with time management, 
there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 90 seconds duration. 
At the end of each task, you will receive new instructions for the following task. 
I will now explain each step of the experiment in detail. Please do not use the computer until 
you are instructed to do so. Please listen carefully and if you have any question, once I finish 
reading, raise your hand and I will come by you. 
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BEGINNING OF THE TASK 
On the computer in front of you the following screen will appear: 
 
You will need to enter the personal code you have been given at the entrance.  
After you have entered the code, please press the arrow button to proceed. 
A yellow box will appear, asking to confirm the personal code. Please check that the personal 
code typed matches exactly the one you have been given and then press confirm to proceed. 
On the next screen an arrow button will appear. Click on the arrow button you can see and a 
screen with four questions will appear. In these questions you will be asked your gender, if 
you have any work experience, if your mother has a job and if your father has a job. Please 
answer all the questions and then press the arrow button. A yellow box will appear asking 
confirmation regarding the answers you gave to the questions. Please press confirm to 
proceed. On the next screen an arrow button will appear. When you press the arrow button 
the practice task starts and you will be asked to move as many balls as possible from the left-
hand side container to the right-hand side container in a 1 minute period. This first task will 
be only to practice with the game and it will only last 1 minute. 
This is an example of what you will see: 
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After 1 minute, the training session will be over and a yellow box will appear confirming that 
you finished this task. 
 
Please click OK to proceed. 
A general screen will appear where there are three buttons: 
 
You will be asked to press one of the three buttons: play 1, play 2 or play 3. Please listen 
carefully to the instructions, I will tell you exactly which button you need to press each 
time. The numbers on the buttons do not correspond to the order of the tasks. You are 
requested to complete all the three tasks but I will tell you in which order. 
The task to complete is always the same: move as many balls as possible from the left-hand 
side container to the right-hand side container in 90 seconds. 
After you finish the three tasks you will be asked to complete a quick questionnaire. Please 
answer every question and then press the arrow button.  
This will be the end of the experiment! Please wait in silence until you will be called to get 
paid. Thanks for your participation today! ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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2. Post-experimental questionnaire 
 
How old are you?  
 
What is the degree programme you are registered for?  
 
What is your nationality?   
 
What is your religion?  
 
What is your marital status?  
 
What is the highest level of education your father has received?  
 
What is the highest level of education your mother has received?  
 
Please indicate your political attitude in the following scale: 
 
Left  о о о о о о о о о Right 
 
How many participants in the experiment do you know by name?   
 
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair? YES NO 
 
Do you think that it is justified to avoid the fare on public transport? YES  NO 
 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need  to be 
very careful in dealing with people? YES  NO 
A 
re you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks? Please use the following scale, where the value 0 means: "risk averse" and the value 10 
means: "fully prepared to take risks". 
 
"Risk averse"  0     1     2     3     3     5    6     7     8     9  10 "Fully prepared to take 
risks" 
 
How did you find the instructions?  EASY   DIFFICULT 
 
How important was it for you to maximise your own income?  
 
NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL 
 
NOT SO IMPORTANT 
 
VERY IMPORTANT 
 
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT   
 
